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Increasing water scarcity, rising costs of irrigation subsidies, and general economic 
liberalization are creating strong incentives for comprehensive water reform with 
establishment of tradable water rights and the development of markets in these rights.  
Experiences in Chile, Mexico, and California indicate that water allocation through markets 
in tradable water rights offers a viable approach to improving the efficiency of water 
allocation, and should receive serious consideration from developing country policy makers. 
 Laws establishing tradable rights should be simple and comprehensive, should clearly define 
the characteristics of water rights and the conditions and regulations governing the trade of 
water rights; should establish and implement water rights registers; delineate the roles of the 
government, institutions, and individuals involved in water allocation and the ways of 
solving conflicts between them; and provide cost-effective protection against negative third 
party and environmental effects which can arise from water trades.  
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  1.  INTRODUCTION
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Water policy in developing countries faces a number of serious challenges, 
foremost among them the need to increase the efficiency of water use in agricultural, 
urban, and industrial use.  Irrigated area accounts for over two-thirds of world rice and 
wheat production, so growth in irrigated output per unit of land and water is essential.  
Improved efficiency in agricultural water use should permit growth to be maintained and, 
at the same time reallocate water from agriculture to urban and industrial uses.  New 
sources of water are increasingly expensive to exploit.  The only source of water savings 
of the necessary magnitude to meet growing demand is irrigated agriculture, which 
generally accounts for at least 80 percent of consumptive use of water in developing 
countries.  The improved efficiency in agricultural use, to truly contribute to reducing 




use.  It does not make sense to make efforts to improve agricultural water use efficiency, 
only to squander these savings to inefficient urban water systems.   
A second major challenge is to sustain the land and water resource base in the 
face of mounting pressure to degrade these resources through waterlogging, salinization, 
groundwater mining, and water pollution.  The third challenge is to reduce the enormous 
financial resources used by governments in building new water infrastructure and in 
water operations and management.  Finally, an overarching challenge is to increase the 
flexibility and responsiveness of resource allocation.  Developing countries in much of 
the world are rapidly liberalizing their economies, putting a premium on flexible 
response in allocation of water, land and other resources in response to changing 
economic opportunities. 
This paper explores the potentials and constraints for the development of markets 
in tradable water rights to help meet these challenges.  Tradable water rights are rights to 
use water that can be transferred all or in part, separately from the transfer of land.  While 
tradable water rights should be permanent, or very long term, to ensure the security of the 
right, the transfer of water rights need not be permanent: water rights can be leased for a 
season, a year, or many years.  The paper uses a comparative case study approach, 
drawing lessons for developing countries from the experiences with tradable water rights 
in California, Chile, and Mexico.  The comparison of these countries provides important 
insights because Chile has had nearly 20 years of experience with markets in tradable 
water rights, following a fundamental restructuring of water laws; Mexico is in the early 




while California has undertaken more gradual reforms to increasing the flexibility of 
water marketing and trading within a long-established water law tradition that is in some 
ways inimical to water markets. 
The analysis draws on detailed case studies (Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1994; 
Rosegrant and Gazmuri, 1994; and Rosegrant, 1994).  The primary focus of the paper is 
on the laws, institutions, and policies that condition the success of allocating water 
through markets in tradable water rights.  The study relies largely on interviews with 
participants and observers of water policy in the study areas, analysis of secondary data, 
and synthesis of existing literature.  A limited amount of primary data collection was also 
undertaken. 
The paper outlines the potential benefits from, and constraints to establishment of 
tradable water rights; examines the underlying incentives which induce institutional and 
legal reform to establish tradable water rights; assesses policies for successful 
implementation of markets in tradable water rights and actual impacts of water market 
allocation in practice; and concludes with lessons for the potential of markets in tradable 
water rights as a key component of water allocation policy in developing countries. 
 
2.  MARKETS IN TRADABLE WATER RIGHTS: BENEFITS AND 
CONSTRAINTS  
For most commodities and inputs, allocation by means of markets has been the 
favored solution of economists.  Economic theory shows that market allocation will be 




transactions costs.  Well-defined and nonattenuated property rights are completely 
specified, exclusive, transferable, and enforceable (Coase, 1960).   
Obviously, the assumption of zero transactions costs does not hold true in markets 
for water rights, where information, conveyance, and enforcement costs may be higher 
than in most input markets.  However, even in a world with transactions costs, markets in 
tradable water rights may lead to considerable efficiency gains and other benefits.  
Tradable water rights empower water users by requiring their consent to any reallocation 
of water and compensation for any water transferred.  Well-defined water rights improve 
the bargaining power of farmers and farmer groups relative to the public irrigation 
bureaucracy.  With secure rights, the water users can invest in water-saving technology 
knowing that they will benefit by selling or otherwise using the water saved.  Farmers 
also have an incentive to shift to water-conserving crops.  The combination of secure 
water and land rights can foster urgently needed private domestic and foreign investment 
in agriculture. 
Marketable rights to water can induce water users to consider the full opportunity 
cost of water, including its value in alternative uses, thus providing incentives to 
efficiently use water and to gain additional income through the sale of saved water, and 
to take account of the costs imposed by their water use on other farmers, reducing the 
pressure to degrade resources.  A simple example is the farmer at the head of the canal 
who overuses water, thereby waterlogging other farmers through excess seepage and 




Compared to the often-recommended volumetric pricing of irrigation water, the 
rights-based approach is also more acceptable to farmers.  Traditional water rights are 
already capitalized into the value of land.  Imposition of volumetric pricing are seen by 
farmers as expropriation of these traditional water rights, which creates capital losses in 
established irrigated farms.  Establishment of transferable water rights instead formalizes 
existing rights to water, increasing the capital value of land.    Market allocation of 
water, and its logical corollary, the requirement for private financing of water 
infrastructure and water management and operation, work in favor of the low income 
population through removal of massive capital and operating subsidies which usually 
favor better-off producers and urban consumers.  Market-based allocation frees-up 
enormous budgetary resources which can be used for targeted subsidies to the poorest 
sectors of the population.   
Finally, allocation of water through tradable rights provides maximum flexibility 
in responding to changes in crop prices and water values as demand patterns and 
comparative advantage change and diversification of cropping proceeds.  The market-
based system is more responsive than centralized allocation of water.   
Despite these potential benefits, the use of market-based water allocation 
mechanisms has been limited by concerns over the possible political, institutional and 
technological constraints to managing such a system, and possible inequities arising from 
market-based allocations.  Laws, institutions, and physical water systems must be 
reformed or developed to equitably assign water rights, to deal with variability of water 




transfers, and to resolve conflicts.  Despite these apparently formidable challenges, 
reforms have been implemented in California, Chile, and Mexico to develop markets in 
tradable water rights.  The next section explores the reasons behind these reforms.   
 
  3.  INCENTIVES FOR MARKETS IN TRADABLE WATER RIGHTS  
The forces behind reform of water allocation to create or expand markets in 
tradable water rights in California, Chile, and Mexico derive from three related 
developments: (1) the increasing economic value of water due to scarcity caused by rapid 
growth in demand for delivered water, depletion of new supply sources, and competition 
for water among agricultural, industrial, urban, and instream uses; (2) rising budgetary 
costs of maintaining centralized control of irrigation and urban water delivery due to 
increasingly expensive and highly subsidized capital development and operations and 
maintenance of water systems; and (3) broad economic liberalization, which increases the 
economic cost of maintaining inflexible and inefficient water allocation systems which 
cannot respond rapidly to changing incentives and comparative advantages.   
The gradual reform of California water law to permit greater flexibility in water 
trading has been driven by the first two factors.  Rapidly growing urban and 
environmental demand for water, the high economic and environmental costs of 
developing new water supplies, public rejection of infrastructure options such as the 
peripheral canal linking the water-surplus north with the increasingly water-scarce south, 
and serious droughts in recent years have induced policy changes to facilitate water 




transfers between agencies throughout the state.  This policy was based on the assessment 
that there are fewer environmental impacts associated with transfers than with 
construction of conventional projects, and although difficult to implement, transfers can 
be implemented more quickly and usually at less cost than construction of additional 
facilities.  Since then, a number of laws have been passed to facilitate the sale, lease, 
exchange, or transfer of water and to ensure that water conveyance facilities are available 
for use in transferring water (Department of Water Resources [DWR], 1992). 
Specific innovations in recent years have included Water Code reform to permit 
the transfers of salvaged or conserved water previously lost to beneficial use, to permit 
the purchase of water for instream flow as a beneficial use, and to allocate available 
conveyance capacity in state water delivery systems to water transfers; the 
implementation of the State Emergency Drought Water Banks in 1991, 1992, and 1994, 
which have demonstrated the ability to quickly broker large-scale market transfers; 
market-like conservation measures such as the deal in which the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California (MWD) paid for the lining of canals and other physical 
and management improvements in the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) in exchange for 
the most of the water conserved; liberalization of rules for water trading in the huge 
federal Central Valley Project; and the completion of general environmental impact 
reports on water transfers which will streamline future analysis of individual transfer 
requests, reducing the costs of verification and approval.  
Water policy reform in Chile and Mexico was partly influenced by growing water 




broad economic reform and budgetary cost considerations.  Although economic 
liberalization is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for development of water 
markets, when a country begins the process of economic reform, moving toward 
liberalized trade and a market-based economy, the establishment of clear and secure land 
and water property rights and market allocation of both resources are necessary to 
generate the full benefits of overall economic reform.  With a liberalized economy, if 
land and water rights are not clear and transferable, the agricultural sector has limited 
flexibility to cope with the changes in demand and prices on international markets.  
General economic liberalization increases the costs of maintaining centralized water 
allocation policies, thereby increasing the incentives to shift to market-oriented water 
policies. 
In the early 1970s, Chile had become a highly centralized and regulated socialist 
economy, following a decade of increasingly socialist policy changes, which included the 
expropriation of land and water rights.  In addition to regulating the economy and fixing 
the most important prices, the state owned practically all of the productive system of both 
goods and services. 
Immediately after the change of government in 1973, the new government shifted 
towards a market-oriented social and economic policy, with complete economic 
liberalization and open trade.  The shift to a market-oriented open trade policy placed a 
premium on efficient and flexible allocation of water, land, and other resources in the 
agricultural sector in response to changing economic incentives and opportunities.  The 




agriculture were the redistribution of land and water resources to the private sector under 
the Agrarian Reform; the definition of clear and well-defined land and water property 
rights; market allocation of both of these resources; and the drastic reduction of general 
water subsidies to both agricultural and urban water users.  
In the early 1990s Mexico began its own process of economic liberalization, 
shifting from a state centralized, highly regulated system, to a market-oriented one.  In 
accordance with this new economic and social approach, the government proceeded to 
reform Article 27 of the Constitution, which had communalized much of land and water 
rights in agriculture, and passed a new Agrarian Law.  Under the new agrarian policy 
farmers become independent from the state in their production and commercial decisions. 
 Full and secure property rights to land were established, both in the communal  (ejidal) 
sector and in the private sector.  Limits to the size of farms were essentially abolished, as 
was the prohibition on foreign land ownership in Mexico.   
Economic reforms meant that after a transition period with direct subsidies to 
farmers, farmers would have to be able to produce at internationally competitive prices 
without subsidies of any kind, except for the extremely poor, non-commercial farmers.  It 
was recognized during the debate over economic reform that, under the new economic 
system, retention of the existing water laws could severely limit the benefits of freeing up 
land markets and liberalizing the economy, and would continue to drain the government 
of budgetary resources because of the huge financial costs and inefficiency in 
construction and management of infrastructure, a costly central administration, and poor 




passage of the new water law, operations and maintenance cost of government-owned 
water and irrigation systems accounted for 0.5 percent of gross national product. 
   The prevailing water law, with centralized water allocation, was also 
considered an important obstacle to successful implementation of the new liberalized 
agricultural policy.  With individual farmers making the cropping decisions, 
bureaucratically-set  water allocation would not match the water requirements of farmer-
determined cropping systems.  Therefore, along with general economic reform, Mexico 
began the process of implementing fundamental changes in its water policy with respect 
to water rights, water management, and allocation of water, with passage of a new Water 
Law in December 1992, which, among other important features described below, created 
tradable water rights, and initiated the process of turning over the operation and 
maintenance of irrigation systems to farmers. 
The case studies show that factors which increase the value of water, that boost 
the cost of government water management, or that increase the costs of maintaining 
relatively inflexible water allocation mechanisms provide strong incentives for 
governments to increase the efficiency of water allocation through reforms to establish 
tradable water rights and market mechanisms for water allocation.  Other countries which 
are experiencing increasing water scarcity and budget drains for water development and 
management and/or undertaking the process of economic liberalization will face similar 
strong pressures to reform water allocation processes to create tradable water rights and 
market-based water allocation.  It is obviously impossible based on these case studies to 




country to move toward market-oriented reform.  Shifting from administrative allocation 
of water rights to market allocation implies a very important, and likely irreversible, 
political decision.  On the one hand it means shifting significant amounts of power from 
the government to the water users; and, on the other, it can mean relieving the 
government of enormous expenses in investments in water infrastructure and operations 
and maintenance costs that are also shifted to the final users.   
The degree to which incentives to establish market-oriented water allocation are 
translated into actual reform is also conditioned by the existing legal and political 
structures and processes governing the use of water resources.  The gradual approach to 
reform undertaken in California has been largely the result of long-standing water law, 
developed under different historical and economic conditions, which in many ways 
constrains water trading; and the interaction of powerful and often competing interest 
groups with high stakes in water.  The role of existing water law in slowing the growth of 
water trading in California will be discussed in detail below.  The interplay of interest 
groups has been equally important in determining the pace of liberalization of water 
trading.  Urban interests have long favored maximum flexibility in making market 
transfers, since growing demand for water is primarily in the urban sector, and water 
transfers would go mainly from agricultural to urban uses.   
Despite considerable dissent from farmers who see the potential benefits from 
water trading, agricultural and rural interests have mainly opposed rapid liberalization of 
water trading, fearing devastating economic losses following massive transfers of water 




is indicative of the rural/agricultural position.  Rice farmers were subject to pressure from 
the local community and rice farmer cooperatives not to participate in the water bank.  
The rice growing regions opposed water sales for several reasons.  Cooperatively owned 
rice processing organizations feared loss of volume, while some growers wanted a higher 
water price.  In addition to these economic reasons, regional political leaders wanted to 
assert the independence of the area of origin of much of the state’s water (Gardner and 
Warner, 1994).   
Environmental interests are ambivalent on the issue of increasing the flexibility of 
water transfers.  While water trading is seen as a partial solution to meeting increasing 
urban demands without building damaging new water projects, many water transfers 
have raised serious concerns that the temperature and flow fluctuations caused by the 
water transfers and releases will be harmful to fish and wildlife, particularly salmon eggs 
and fry.   The political dynamics arising from the interplay of these competing interest 
groups, together with the existing legal structure (and an extraordinarily difficult 
hydrological and physical environment, to be described below) have dictated an 
incremental approach to increased water trading in California. 
The political conditions for establishment of markets in tradable water rights in 
Chile and Mexico, which are more representative of other developing countries, are also 
far more conducive to comprehensive reform than in the California case.  In Chile and 
Mexico, the main stakeholders in water, the farmers, did not have a strong interest in the 
status quo; to the contrary, the existing system of water law and management gave 




management of the resource.  As will be shown in more detail below, comprehensive 
legal reform to establish tradable water rights was seen as a major benefit by farmers, and 
has received strong political support by farmers.  Support for comprehensive reform has 
also been strong in the broader government ministries dealing with agricultural, finance, 
and economic planning, which have had to cope with the adverse economic and fiscal 
consequences of the existing water policies.  The main proponents of a slower or more 
limited reform of water rights have instead been the bureaucracies which have directly 
controlled water management.  
In Mexico, although there was broad agreement within the government on the 
need for well-defined, secure tradable water rights, there were differences in preferences 
on the appropriate degree of regulation of water markets and on the speed of turnover of 
irrigation systems to users.  The Ministry of Agriculture was in favor of a rapid turnover 
of the administration of water and water infrastructure, as well as financial responsibility, 
to newly created independent water users associations (WUAs), while the Comision 
Nacional del Agua (which builds and manages water infrastructure) favored a period of 
co-administration between the water authority and the users, especially in respect to dams 
and river basins.  The law that was passed in December 1992 reflected a compromise of 
these positions. 
In Chile, the only serious attempt to modify the new Water Code was introduced 
in legislation developed at the Ministry of Public Works.  The legislation, sent to 
parliament in December 1992, generated a heated public discussion among policy makers 




not used for 5 years from the time of  effective use established in the grant; (b) 
requirement that prospective grantees should demonstrate need for the water 3; (c) 
provision of more authority to the central government in conflicts related to water 
pollution and third party effects; (d) creation of Administrative Associations of River 
Basins (Administradoras de Cuencas Hidrogrįficas), including both private and public 
entities; and (e) assignment of rights to specific use (agricultural, industrial, or 
household) in the most arid regions of the country.  A change in use would then require 
government approval. 
All of these provisions reduce the security of existing water rights, and increase 
the administrative discretion of the government in water allocation.  Water users 
associations and farmers associations therefore strongly opposed the legislation.  The bill 
has been frozen out of the legislative agenda by parliament, and the government has not 
reintroduced it.  
It is clear that the different degrees of willingness of government countries to 
transfer economic power to the people, different government perceptions of the role of 
the state in managing key resources, and the political interests and strengths of the main 
stakeholders in water will be important factors in determining whether and to what extent 
tradable water rights and market allocation will be established.  However, the politics of 
water in Chile and Mexico, which appear to representative of many developing countries, 
have proven to be conducive to comprehensive reform.  With trends in much of the 
developing world pointing toward growing water scarcity, rapidly increasing fiscal costs 




increasing general economic liberalization, all of which create pressures for reform of 
water allocation policy, it is important to understand how markets in tradable water rights 
can be established and managed.    
 
4.  POLICIES FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADABLE 
WATER RIGHTS  
 
In general, reform of water allocation mechanisms to implement markets in 
tradable water rights can either be part of comprehensive reform aimed at improving 
efficiency of the entire water distribution system as in Chile and Mexico, or can be 
incremental, as shown by the California case, which has gradually increased the 
flexibility of water trading within the context of a legal code which is in many ways 
antithetical to trading of water rights. 
Outside of the often highly effective endogenously managed irrigation managed 
irrigation systems which are found in small numbers throughout the world, water rights 
in developing countries are typically poorly defined and precarious.  Comprehensive 
reform of water law is therefore the most effective means of moving toward markets in 
tradable water rights within the developing country context.  To form the basis for 
allocation of water through tradable rights, the law should be simple and comprehensive, 
should clearly define the characteristics of water rights and the conditions and regulations 
governing the trade of water rights; establish and implement water rights registers; 




allocation and the ways of solving conflicts between them; and provide protection against 
negative third party and environmental effects which can arise from water trades. 
Creation of tradable water rights can be highly beneficial even if public 
ownership and management of water supply and delivery systems is maintained.  
However, a logical (and in the longer run probably compelling) extension of 
comprehensive reform, which may significantly increase the benefits of establishment of 
tradable water rights, is the privatization of some or all of the physical infrastructure.  If 
this step is taken, the water law should also set the ground rules for turnover of existing 
irrigation system infrastructure to water users, for the approval and financing of new 
infrastructure construction, and for the privatization and regulation of urban water and 
sewage services.  These reforms were handled comprehensively in the Chilean water law 
reform, and to a significant extent in the Mexican reform. 
Within the context of reform to create markets in tradable water rights, whether 
wholesale or incremental, a number of complex implementation issues arise.  The next 
several sections explore the lessons that can be learned from the case studies on 
appropriate policies for implementing effective markets in tradable property rights.   
Important issues that arise include the method for initial allocation of water rights, 
definition of rights as prior or proportional, consumptive use and the treatment of return 
flows in water trading, negative indirect economic effects, protection of the environment, 
the role of water user associations, infrastructural requirements, and the role of public 
and private institutions.  A key theme will reappear throughout this discussion: the 




protection of the interests of all participants in the market allocation of water, while at the 
same time maintaining low enough transaction costs to make water markets operate 
efficiently.    
TRANSACTION COSTS 
Transaction costs arise whether water allocation is determined through 
administrative discretion or through water markets, and include (a) the cost of identifying 
profitable opportunities for transferring water, (b) the costs of negotiating or 
administratively deciding on the water transfer, (c) the cost of monitoring possible third 
party effects and other externalities, (d) the infrastructure cost of actually conveying the 
water and monitoring the transfers, and (e) the infrastructure and institutional cost of 
monitoring, mitigating, or eliminating possible third party effects and externalities. 
    Under administrative allocation, a public or quasi-public water authority 
(e.g., a river basin commission, or a national or regional water authority) would identify 
water demands or alternative uses and simply reallocate existing water allocations or 
rights to higher-valued uses.  Since the losers will undoubtedly protest, the authority will 
have to negotiate with the users and find some way of compensating the losers.   
Administrative allocation also may be subject to political pressures,  and is often subject 
to high costs of inefficiency  and private rent seeking by those managing the system, who 
do not have the same incentive to minimize the total cost of  water transfer as a buyer 
would, 
Markets in tradable water rights, on the other hand, use the price response of users 




low-valued uses will give up water to higher valued uses in a decentralized decision 
process involving the individual users.  With tradable rights, since buyers will bear the 
costs of conveyance and mitigation, they will attempt to find those trades which 
minimize the total of purchase price, conveyance, and mitigation costs.   Water markets 
thus have some important possible advantages in minimizing transactions costs, but the 
ways in which markets are organized and regulated have a major impact on transaction 
costs.  Excessive regulation which creates high transaction costs can greatly reduce the 
benefits of  water trading, while inadequate regulation can impose unacceptable costs on 
third parties or the environment.   The ways in which water law, institutions, and 
technology can balance the protection of interested parties in the water market allocation 
process with the transaction costs of this process are explored in several sections below.  
FAIRNESS IN INITIAL ALLOCATION OF WATER RIGHTS  
The first condition for success in developing tradable water rights is agreement on 
the rules of the game, beginning with the perception of fairness in the initial assignments 
of water rights.  The fairness objective seems to have been met in Chile and Mexico, by 
basing the initial allocation on historical water use, combined (in Chile) with 
redistribution of concentrated rights holdings.  The assignment of rights is formalized 
through registration of the rights in Public Registries in each country.  In Mexico, the 
fundamental basis for initial allocation of water rights is the existing informal or formal 
water right already held; previous water use can be established by certification from an 
Irrigation District or ejido administrator, or by testimony of neighbors as to the 




is at an early stage, discussions with farmers and officials do not indicate much concern 
that the initial allocation process will be inequitable.  Titling of land rights in the same 
areas as water rights is well underway.  The prior or simultaneous completion of land 
titling facilitates the allocation of water rights.    In Chile, the establishment of 
tradable water rights beginning in 1975 was linked to the re-privatization of land that had 
been collectivized in 1966.  Land and the proportional right to water historically used on 
this land was returned 40 percent to former landowners and 60 percent to former workers 
on the lands.  After the turmoil caused by expropriation of land and water in the 1960s, 
the establishment of tradable water rights and redistribution of a large portion of these 
water rights to former landless laborers was seen as an substantial improvement in equity. 
 In California, the equity of initial assignment of rights has not been a major issue in the 
context of increasing the flexibility of water.  Available water rights have long since been 
fully appropriated.   However, the fairness of reallocation of rights through market or 
other mechanisms arises in an number of contexts below.  
 
PRIOR VS. PROPORTIONAL WATER RIGHTS 
A key distinction between water rights in California on the one hand and Chile 
and Mexico on the other is that the former defines rights on a priority basis, while the 
latter two effectively define the water right as proportional to streamflow or canal flow.  
In Mexico, water rights are technically specified in volumetric terms, rather than in 
proportion to streamflow; and the irrigation districts and water user associations (WUAs) 




boundaries.  Indications are that surpluses and deficits will simply be allocated 
proportionally across all existing rights, so that, for example if streamflow is 20 percent 
below normal, each rights holder will receive 20 percent less water.  This procedure 
effectively converts the volumetric right to a proportion of streamflow right.  In Chile, 
water rights are proportional rights (shares) over a variable flow or quantity; deeds 
stipulate that an owner has the right to a certain number of shares at a certain location.  
These rights are expressed in volume by unit of time (liters per second or cubic meters 
per year or month) and are proportional if supply is insufficient.  
   In California, both riparian rights and appropriative rights to water exist, 
but tradable water comes exclusively from water held under appropriative rights doctrine. 
 The appropriative rights doctrine limits the flexibility of reallocating water to the most 
productive purposes in response to shortages induced by drought.  The "first in time, first 
in right" principle in the appropriative rights system ensures that, when shortages occur, 
senior rights holders, who established their rights before junior appropriators, receive 
first priority to available water, whether or not the water they are using the water for 
high-valued purposes.  Because these priorities are not based on economic returns, but on 
chronological time of establishment of the water right, considerable inefficiencies can 
occur due to deprivation of higher values uses of water. 
Water shortages in federal water projects in California are in theory handled 
differently from privately acquired appropriative rights, in that water users within a 
reclamation district share the effects of drought.  Thus even the most senior irrigator in a 




in the district.  However, often the burden is deliberately shared unequally.  In 
California’s San Joaquin Valley, for example, most water districts allocate surface water 
on the basis of acreage served, and during shortages, many give preference to lands 
growing permanent crops (Reisner and Bates, 1990).  Thus, under either state or federal 
water rights, top-down rationing of water is often invoked during droughts.  The inability 
to get water where it is most needed during shortages is a major limitation of the prior 
rights system. 
The choice as to which type of rights works best to facilitate water markets must 
balance out the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two approaches (Howe, 
Schurmeier, and Shaw, 1986).  The priority rights system allows different degrees of 
water supply reliability to be purchased, but the heterogeneous nature of the rights makes 
it difficult to organize the market.  With proportional rights, some inefficiencies may be 
introduced because users must hold more shares to reach any given level of assurance of 
water supply due to the variable supply of water, but the homogeneity of proportional 
rights makes it much easier to create markets.  The proportional rights system is also 
more flexible and equitable in allocating water deficits than a prior rights approach.  The 
equal sharing of shortages is an important advantage.  Overall, the advantages of the 
proportional rights approach in facilitating market creation and in equitable allocation of 
deficits outweigh the possible market inefficiencies from the need to hold extra shares 
(see also Frederick, 1985).   
The proportional rights system has worked well in water trading in Chile, despite 




their purchase or lease decisions depending on the probable yield of a water right at any 
particular time.  A typical case of a short-term cash rental would be a farmer who uses 3 
shares of 15 l/sec to irrigate 30 ha of high yield wheat from October to December.  He 
crops his wheat in late December and rents the water from January until April, to a 30 ha 
sugarbeet producer, who also uses his own 3 shares for irrigation.  This last farmer will 
be willing to rent water because each share will actually be delivering only about 7-8 
l/sec during the low flow summer period (see Appendix 1).  With the rental of water, the 
sugarbeet farmer completes the 45 l/sec he needs.  If the water market was not available, 
the wheat farmer would apply his water to a lower income purpose, such as irrigating the 
wheat-cropped land for grazing.  On the other hand, the sugarbeet farmer would have to 
cultivate only the 15 ha he can irrigate with his summer availability of water.  With the 
rental options, both farmers win.   
CONSUMPTIVE USE AND RETURN FLOWS 
A second key distinction between water rights in California and in Chile and 
Mexico lies in the definition of the tradable portion of the water right.  In California, the 
transferable portion of the appropriative water right is limited to consumptive use, with 
protection of third-party rights to return flows.  This system protects prior rights to return 
flows, but, depending on the implementing regulations, significantly increases the 
transaction costs of water trading, because of the difficulty in measuring consumptive use 
and return flows.  
California’s system for determining the tradable fraction of appropriative water 




water seller for determination of how much water is tradable.  Six sources of tradable 
water are available: fallowing (not irrigating crops), shifting to lower water-using crops, 
substitution of groundwater for surface irrigation water, direct delivery of groundwater, 
conserved water, and water from reservoir storage.  In regulating each of these types of 
transfer, the Department of Water Resources distinguishes between new water, which is 
water previously not available to the system; real water, which is water available for 
transfer that is not derived at the expense of other water rights holders; and paper water, 
which is water proposed for sale that does not create an actual increase in system supply. 
 Strict requirements are placed on each category for identifying the new or real water 
available for transfer.  The level of proof required can be illustrated for the case of 
fallowing.   
Water saved by withholding irrigation water from the field for an entire irrigation 
season can be transferred to another use.  Although this concept appears straightforward, 
determination of tradable water requires verification of farmer intentions, adequacy of 
water supply, and computation of consumptive use.  To determine farmer cropping 
intentions, the DWR uses long-term crop and water records, and personal knowledge of 
extension agents and other experts.    Determination of availability of water requires 
information about the rights and contracts pertaining to the fallowed farm, together with 
estimation of actual availability of irrigation water during the period of transfer.  For 
short term transfers, this is relatively easy, but for long term transfers, there is 
considerable uncertainty, since the future availability can vary due to droughts, 




The final step in determining tradable water is computation of consumptive use.  
In California, the concept of "consumptive use" has evolved over time, and there is still 
some uncertainty in interpretation.  However, the generally accepted definition is now 
actual crop evapotranspiration of the crops plus  percolation of water that is lost to further 
use.  Under the 1992 CVPIA water available for trade includes "water that would have 
been consumptively used" and water "irretrievably lost to beneficial use."  Thus, water 
which would otherwise percolate to the degraded groundwater in parts of the San Joaquin 
Valley would be tradable, but water draining to wetlands or used by vegetation that 
provides significant wildlife habitat would not be tradable (DWR, December 1993). 
Chile and Mexico have in essence followed an alternative model developed in the 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD), where rights are proportional 
to streamflow and rights to return flow are retained by the district.  Return flows are 
made available to water users at no charge, but no rights are established to these flows.  
Changes in patterns of return flows due to trades are therefore not actionable.  By 
defining away third-party rights to return flows, the NCWCD has greatly reduced 
transactions costs to trades, resulting in a very active water market (Howe, Schurmeier, 
and Shaw, 1986; Cummings and Nercessiantz, 1992).  
Chile and Mexico have followed the NCWCD model by defining tradable rights 
as full diversion rights which are proportional to stream or canal flow.  Rights to return 
flow do not exist.  In Chile, return flows to neighboring areas may be used by the 
recipients without the need to establish a right of use.  However, use of this water is 




There is no obligation to supply return flows and such flows are thus not permanent.  In 
Mexico, the initial concession of water rights is based on the normal previous 
consumption of water by the individual or group.  However the law makes clear that this 
"consumption" is not the "consumptive use" rights with obligation to maintain a specific 
amount of return flow which are common in the western U. S., but rather is the full 
diversion right.   
The question of which system is more appropriate for developing countries raises 
complex issues.  Potential water transfers that are not made because of restrictive 
regulations can be very costly due to the gains from trade foregone.  The transactions 
costs of enforcing the consumptive rights approach can be very high, reducing the 
number of trades possible; on the other hand, the consumptive rights approach more 
clearly protects third parties against adverse impacts from water trades.  The decision on 
which approach to use is ultimately an empirical question.  If the lost benefits from 
failure to undertake water trades due to the high transactions costs of enforcing return 
flows are greater than the net cost of adverse impacts resulting from lost return flows, 
then the full diversion right approach is preferable.  To the extent that real losses do 
occur from loss of return flows, innovative methods could be used to compensate those 
who are hurt by loss of return flows.  Reforms that could move in this direction would be 
to provide financial compensation for losses out of the proceeds of the trade, or 
reservation of a portion of water rights to the water user associations, water districts or 
other water suppliers to be allocated to compensate for actual damages due to reduction 




Under developing country conditions, the Chile and Mexico approach of tradable 
shares with no rights to return flows is preferable as a general principle; enforcement of 
consumptive rights following the California model would be extraordinarily costly and 
would likely prevent the development of markets.  Nevertheless, within many countries, 
hydrological conditions in some river basins, where return flows are very large and 
traditional rights to these flows exist, will make additional protection of return flows 
necessary.   
In Chile, there are two important river basins where additional protection to return 
flows has been employed: the Aconcagua River, in an area with a large proportion of 
high- valued crops; and the Elqui river, a small but significant river because it is located 
in the desert zone.  These two rivers irrigate very narrow valleys, and return flows are 
large.  The reduction or elimination of return flows, due to sales or efficiency gains, may 
affect drastically the total flow of a section of the river.  The Elqui River Water Users 
Association has dealt with this problem by limiting trades within upstream areas to 
farmer-to-farmer transactions (to retain all return flows within the basin), with 
agriculture-urban transactions authorized only in the downstream area.     
Where return flows are highly significant, other methods could also be tested to 
protect these flows while keeping transactions costs low.  New Mexico uses simpler and 
less costly procedures than California.  The State Engineer’s Office determines 
transferable water quantities utilizing standard formulae together with historical and 
secondary data.  Reliance on standard transferable quantities for specific regions, soils 




engineering experts, saves staff time of the water agencies, and creates more certainty in 
the transfer process (Colby, 1988).  
An even simpler procedure would be to create a uniform presumption regarding 
consumptive use and return flows, which eliminates the need to determine consumptive 
use on a case-by-case basis.  In Wyoming, the statute which authorizes temporary water 
transfers creates a presumption that 50 percent of diverted water is allocated to return 
flows, with the remainder considered to be the tradable quantity.  Although attempts to 
rebut the presumption could be made, these would likely be infrequent if the presumption 
is a reasonable approximation.  If, as is likely, a uniform state-wide presumption is not 
feasible due to different agroclimatic conditions, regional presumptions could be 
established (Gould, 1989).   
An approach worth assessing in practice in river basins where return flows are 
significant would be a combination of the Elqui and New Mexico methods.  A 
determination could be first made of areas where return flow restrictions were not 
necessary, because return flows are lost to beneficial use.   In these areas, such as the 
downstream area of the Elqui, any trades could be made of the fully diverted share.  In all 
other sections of the river basin, intersectoral water trades (which would affect beneficial 
use of return flows) would be subject to a presumptive return flow allowance.  In 
evaluating any of these alternatives to protect return flows where it is empirically 
necessary, the key is to keep the transaction costs low while limiting return flow 
presumptions to the maximum that are genuinely produced, so as to preserve incentives 





PROTECTION AGAINST NEGATIVE INDIRECT ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
Water transfers can negatively affect business activities, local government fiscal 
capacity and the quality of public services in areas from which water is being transferred 
because of the reduction in irrigated area or production and  with associated reductions in 
agriculturally-linked economic activities in the area of origin and in the property tax 
base.  In addition, permanent transfer of water rights may limit future economic 
development in the area of origin.  If, in the future, economic conditions make expanded 
irrigated agriculture, new industrial activities, or residential development economically 
attractive, then water may not be available locally to pursue these opportunities.  
Although area-of-origin effects are of understandable concern to area residents, analysis 
suggests that the direct and indirect economic impacts of water transfers on the area of 
origin generally are small from a regional or state perspective.   Indirect economic effects 
from the water transfers using the 1991 California State Emergency Drought Water Bank 
were small.  Farmers who sold water to the Bank reduced farm operating costs by $17.7 
million, or 11 percent, and crop sales by $77.1 million, or 20 percent.  These reductions 
adversely affected the suppliers of farm inputs and the handlers and processors of farm 
outputs, but the impacts were not large when compared to the agricultural economy in the 
selling region.  The study estimated that operating costs, crop sales, and agribusiness 
revenues dropped 2 to 3 percent in selling counties because of the Bank (Dixon, Moore, 




Despite these relatively small impacts, in California, both State and Federal law 
contain projections against general economic impacts, and more have been proposed.  
During the years when major water projects were being developed, a variety of area-of-
origin legislation was enacted to protect local Northern California supplies from being 
depleted as a result of the projects.  For example, County of Origin Statutes provide for 
the reservation of water supplies for counties in which the water originates when, in the 
judgment of the State Water Resources Control Board, water transfers will deprive the 
county of water necessary for its present and future development.  State law also 
prohibits the use of public agency facilities to transfer water unless a finding is made of 
no unreasonable impact on the overall economy of the county from which the water is 
diverted.  Further restrictions on aggregate amounts of water which can be transferred are 
embodied in recently enacted provisions requiring that water suppliers limit the amount 
of transferrable water made available by fallowing to 20 percent of the water that would 
have been applied or stored by the supplier.    
Explicit protection for specific categories of indirect adverse impacts are not 
included in the Chilean and Mexican water laws.  However both laws provide for strong 
protection of third party rights arising from trades.  In addition to approval authority by 
local WUA, third-parties who could be damaged by a trade are further protected through 
prohibition of damaging transfers or setting of compensation; with appeals to CNA in 
Mexico and the National Water Authority in Chile; and final appeal to courts in each 




Furthermore, in Mexico, the greater the change in the type of consumptive use of 
water through a proposed trade (which increases the probability of indirect impacts), the 
greater the scrutiny the trade receives in the approval process.   All transfers of water 
rights must be recorded in the Public Registry of Water Rights maintained by the CNA.  
In general, the process can be seen as a regulatory hierarchy, with water user associations 
having authority over trades among individuals, the regulations of the irrigation district 
have primacy over the water user associations, and the CNA having authority over 
operations of the IDs.  The Transfers among farmers in the same general locale have been 
commonplace for decades, with implicit or explicit CNA approval, so it is unlikely that 
CNA will exercise a heavy hand over these types of transfers.  However,  CNA intends to 
play a strong role in approving and brokering intersectoral trades, with particular 
attention to possible adverse indirect impacts. 
Evidence from Chile suggests that not only are negative impacts small, but that 
the agricultural regions have benefited substantially from water trading.  An important 
outcome of Chile’s water policy is the purchase of agricultural water by urban water 
suppliers without having to buy land or expropriate water.  There have rarely been 
negative effects in the agricultural zones surrounding water-demanding urban areas, 
because farmers mostly sell small portions of their rights and maintain agricultural 
production with highly efficient on-farm irrigation technology for the orchard or 
vegetable crops grown in these areas. 
Agriculture-urban trades consist mostly of purchases of rights from farmers by the 




water companies serving Santiago buys water rights of the Mapocho river from several 
farmers in order to provide water to a new housing development or new industry.  The 
farmers would usually sell a small portion of their rights, which they can dispose of 
because they have improved their irrigation efficiency.  The farmers obtain an important 
amount of fresh capital in exchange for their water rights.  A farmer who increases 
irrigation efficiency by 30 percent on a 40 ha grape farm can dispose of water rights 
shares equivalent to 24 l/sec, selling for $7,000-$10,000, without reducing agricultural 
production. 
The five percent per annum growth in Chilean agriculture since reform of land 
and water rights also calls into question any presumption of negative area-of-origin 
effects on agriculture, which is the source of virtually all water sales.  With the increasing 
value of water, the area planted to fruits and vegetables, which require more water per 
hectare, but far less water per value of output, than most field crops, increased during the 
period 1975-1982 by 206,000 hectares, replacing traditional crops and irrigated pastures 
that needed less water.  In addition, two studies have attempted to measure the increase in 
aggregate water use efficiency in agriculture from 1975 to 1992.  The first study found a 
26 percent  increase in efficiency (Munita, 1994), and the second one a 22 percent 
increase (Frķas, 1992).  Considering the lowest estimate, and taking into account that 
Chile’s total irrigated area, with permanent rights, amounts to 1,200,000 hectares, this is 
equivalent to freeing-up enough water to irrigate an additional 264,000 hectares of crops 




investment of about $400 million in new infrastructure would be required to generate the 
incremental water saved through efficiency gains generated by policy reforms. 
The experiences of California and Chile thus suggests that negative indirect 
economic effects from water trading are small or non-existent; in Chile, tradability of 
water has contributed to diversification and rapid growth of the agricultural sector.  
Broad-based area-of-origin protection against intra-regional or intra-basin trade on vague 
grounds of "unreasonable impact"  can suppress otherwise effective water markets, 
providing excessive discretionary power to regulatory agencies.  Given the generally 
small impacts of these indirect costs of trade, it would be better to make explicit what is 
unreasonable, and to place the burden of proof on the area-of-origin to demonstrate 
negative impacts. 
 
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
The evidence from the case studies shows that allocation of water by markets is 
perfectly compatible with environmental protection.  Implementation of  environmental 
protection in a market system is no more difficult than with administrative allocation.  In 
fact, in California, many environmental groups have joined with urban interests in 
cautious support of water marketing as the way to meet growing water demands without 
building new infrastructure, which is seen as more damaging to the environment than 
water transfers.  Among the three case study areas, California’s water policy includes by 
far the most protection for the environment, followed by Mexico and Chile.  In 




fish, wildlife, or other instream uses.  A wide range of environmental and water quality 
laws affect the feasibility of water transfers.  Probably the most significant constraints are 
those imposed by the Federal and State Endangered Species Acts (ESA).  Under the 
ESA, an endangered species is one that is in danger of extinction in all or a significant 
part of its range, and a threatened species is one that is likely to become endangered in 
the near future.  The ESA prohibits the "take" of endangered species and threatened 
species for which protective regulations have been adopted.  Take has been broadly 
defined to include actions (including water transfers) that could harm or harass listed 
species or that cause a significant loss of their habitat.  This interpretation imposes severe 
limitations on the timing of volume possible water transfers which affect natural flow 
rates through the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.  A large portion of potential future 
market transfers would need to be pumped through the Delta (see also below), so these 
limitations may seriously constrain the growth in market transfers.   
In Mexico, the new water law is the first to establish strong explicit protection of 
the environment.  The law stipulates a regulatory, rather than a market or tax/subsidy 
approach.  The quality of discharge for non-agricultural uses must be specified in the 
granting of the water right, and the CNA can invoke restrictions over water use in the 
event of damage to ecosystems, overexploitation of aquifers, and other environmental 
impacts.   A minimum streamflow is established for rivers, but explicit reservation of 
flows for environmental purposes is not made.  The transfer of water rights for in-stream 




Invocation of restricted or prohibited areas gives the CNA particularly strong 
powers to regulate water transfers which could affect the environment.  The law provides 
that the CNA may regulate the extraction and utilization of water, and establish restricted 
areas or reserves by reasons of public interest: to prevent overexploitation of aquifers, to 
protect or restore an ecosystem, to preserve sources of potable water or protect them 
against pollution, to preserve and control water quality and in case of unusual water 
shortages or drought.  Under these provisions, the CNA has full control over extraction, 
discharge, and transfer of water in affected areas.  Some 70 percent of total irrigated area 
served by groundwater is currently under some form of prohibition or restriction. 
In Chile, strong environmental protection is lacking in the Water Code, although 
several provisions allow protection of environmental interests.  All major infrastructure 
construction (dams of more than 50,000 cubic meters or aqueducts carrying more than 2 
cubic meters per second) need authorization of the DGA in order to prevent harmful 
third-party effects or environmental damage.  The DGA is also empowered to undertake 
vigilance over water in natural channels for public use and will prevent the building, 
modification, or destruction of waterworks along natural channels unless prior 
authorization has been obtained.  The president of the Republic, at the request or upon 
the report of the DGA, may declare drought zones during extraordinary dry periods for 
maximum and non-deferrable six-month periods. The DGA will determine, by resolution, 
the drought periods that are to be considered extraordinary. 
Once a drought zone has been declared, if no agreement is reached between the 




use water available in natural waterways and in channels that impound water from them.  
With the aim of minimizing the general drought-induced environmental and other 
damage, the DGA may suspend the authority of the users’ organizations.  Any holder of 
rights  who might receive a lesser portion of water than is their due (in accordance with 
existing availability) will be entitled to state compensation for the lost portion.  These 
protections will be significantly enhanced with the recent passage of the Environmental 
Protection Law. 
The range and type of environmental protection thus vary widely across the three 
case studies.  As with the case for protection of return flows, a balance must be struck 
between the benefits from environmental protection, and the costs of rejecting profitable 
water trades.  Some analysts of the California water scene have argued that regulations 
and mandated water allocations for fish and wildlife have resulted in excessive protection 
of the environment against other uses of water, and that a market-based approach to 
environmental protection would be preferable (Gardner and Warner, 1994).  A possible 
reform that would increase market flexibility and better measure preferences across all 
types of final demands would be to reduce mandated water allocations for environmental 
purposes and require that environmental interests compete for scarce water in the market. 
 The primary economic argument in support of mandated environmental allocations is 
that the benefits of water allocations to fish and wildlife are dispersed across a large 
number of people, so it is very difficult to form coalitions to purchase water rights.  
However, private groups have in fact begun to purchase instream water rights in 




which would be subject to public determination) for purchase of instream water would 
also facilitate a market allocation approach to environmental uses of water.  The latter 
policy has already been implemented on a small scale in California.  The Department of 
Fish and Game purchased 41,000 acre feet of water from the 1991 Drought Water and 
16,000 acre feet from the 1992 bank.   However, it must be noted that at least the first 
part of this policy would meet with strong opposition from environmentalists.  
Environmental groups have won substantial gains in mandating water for environmental 
purposes, and would likely oppose a policy that "gives back" some of these gains.  In the 
final instance, in any society,  how much environmental protection will be provided will 
be a matter of political choice. 
 
THE ROLE OF WATER USER ASSOCIATIONS 
It has been argued that establishment of tradable property rights in water is 
somehow antithetical to traditional community values, and inimical to communal 
management of water (Young, 1986; Mumme and Ingram, 1985).  However, assignment 
of tradable property rights to individuals within water user associations, or even to 
communal groups themselves, should in fact enhance the control of these groups over 
water resources, better insuring access to water than is often the case with existing water 
user groups.  In practice, turnover of irrigation systems in many countries has simply 
legitimized the transfer of the responsibilities for operations and management to farmers, 
thereby reducing the costs of financially strapped public bureaucracies.  However, the 




fundamental incentives governing water use.  If well-defined transferable water rights are 
granted to the group, or to the individuals within the group, water user groups would 
have the incentive to economize on water use, and would have the legal standing to 
negotiate with the water delivery agency for timely and efficient service.   
In both Chile and Mexico, strong water user associations play a major role in 
allocation of water.  In Chile, user associations own and manage the physical 
infrastructure, monitor the allocation of water, approve water transfers subject to specific 
conditions, and provide the initial (and usually final) forum for conflict resolution.  In 
Mexico, the turnover of irrigation districts to newly organized water user associations is 
fundamental to the establishment of water rights.   Under law, water rights can be 
provided to individuals or groups, but there appears to be a strong preference for 
concessions to be made to groups, with the groups then to grant subsidiary water rights to 
their members through internal processes to be authorized by the CNA. 
An important question arises as to whether  water rights, or full veto power over 
all water trades should be granted to water user groups.  On the one hand, assignment of 
tradable property rights in water to communal groups may be more cost-effective than 
assigning rights to individuals in instances when internalizing bargaining within the 
group reduces the information, contractual, and enforcement costs relative to pair-wise 
bargaining by individuals.  To prevent domination of groups by powerful individuals 
would require the establishment of transparent decision-making mechanisms within the 
community.  It is essential in either case that the assignment of property rights is 




On the other hand, assigning tradable water rights to a group, while preferable to 
most existing allocation systems, inevitably weakens the security of these rights to the 
individual, who is making the fundamental farming and other resource allocation 
decisions.  The experience in California indicates that granting too much authority to 
water user associations can also stifle development of water markets.    Recent 
reforms of the laws governing water transfers in the huge Central Valley Project operated 
by the federal Bureau of Reclamation were designed to reduce the power of irrigation 
districts to veto trades and to increase the flexibility of water marketing, by providing 
that all individuals and districts receiving CVP water may transfer it to any other entity 
for any project or purpose recognized as a beneficial use under State law.  The affected 
district has approval power only over transfers involving over 20 percent of the CVP 
water under long-term contract with the district.  This clause, allowing farmers to sell up 
to 20 percent of their water without approval of their local irrigation or water district or 
agency, has, for the first time, vested the property right to the first 20 percent of contract 
water directly in the individual user (Howitt, 1994). 
These conditions contrast sharply with the incentives facing potential water 
sellers in Bureau of Reclamation districts before passage of the CVPIA.  Water transfers 
required permission from existing irrigation and water districts in the project, and the 
transfer could not be detrimental to the project or to any senior appropriator.  In effect, as 
long as any users in the district could use the water at its nominal cost, individuals could 
not sell water at market prices.  With these legislative restrictions on gains from trade, 




Strong water user associations are a key to success of development markets in tradable 
water rights, but excessive power vested in the water user association is also detrimental 
to market development. 
In Chile strong Water Users Associations have the authority to veto water 
transfers in artificial water courses if they cause hydraulic third party effects, or if the 
buyer does not finance the necessary infrastructure changes to assure no effect on water 
rights delivery to third parties; and also can deprive water to those who don’t pay the 
water fees for O&M or investment repayment.  Nevertheless there has been virtually no 
conflict between WUAs and individual water users within the WUA because the 
authority of the WUA is limited to specific cause, and perhaps more importantly, because 
the water rights are individually titled.  When rights are held by the individuals there is a 
natural balance of power between them and the WUAs. 
INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR TRADABLE WATER RIGHTS 
Sophisticated measuring devices, division boxes, and other conveyance structures 
are not necessary to implement a water trading system.  Effective water markets are 
operating in Chile (and are beginning to operate in Mexico) with conveyance 
infrastructure no more advanced than that in most irrigation systems in mostly 
developing countries. Water is usually measured only in the main channels, and 
thereafter, simple proportional division devices are used, which divide the water into the 
assigned shares in proportion to canal flow.  The question of technology is more a matter 
of degree than an either/or situation: better technology will improve the efficiency of 




trading, but significant gains from trade can be realized without highly sophisticated 
technology.  Moreover, there is synergy between markets and technological improvement 
in conveyance: technological innovations in water delivery and metering will reduce 
transactions cost and encourage market-oriented reform in allocative mechanisms, while 
markets in turn can induce technological change by increasing the returns to investments 
(Young, 1986). 
Ironically, California, with the most sophisticated technology by far in the case 
study areas, faces the most difficult hydrological/physical constraints to water trading, 
due to its unique geography.  If water transfers are to be made on a large scale in 
California, a substantial portion of these transfers will be transported by either the 
California State Water Project (SWP) or the federal Central Valley Project (CVP), and 
will be pumped by these projects through the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, the 1,153 
square mile region located where California’s two biggest rivers converge and flow into 
San Francisco Bay.  Forty-two percent of the state’s annual runoff flows through the 
Delta.  The SWP and CVP water facilities in the south Delta pump water to supply farms 
and cities in central and southern California, providing water to about two-thirds of the 
state’s population.  These projects and local facilities also provide about 60 percent of the 
water used in the San Francisco Bay area.  The Delta is also a rich agricultural region 
where a combination of flat topography, mild climate and abundant water produced $375 
million in farm products in 1987.  Delta waters support 28 native and 28 non-native fish 
populations, in addition to the salmon and steelhead populations that migrate through the 




California only if a fair balance can be found among these urban, agricultural and 
environmental uses resolving the Delta’s very complex and controversial water issues. 
Strict Delta protection requirements may severely constrain the potential for an 
increased volume of water transfers through the Delta.  In order to minimize impacts on 
the winter run chinook salmon, Delta smelt, and striped bass in the Delta, and to avoid 
disruption of service to existing contractors, pumping of water by the SWP and CVP 
through the Delta to meet transfer agreements has been mainly limited to the period of 
August through October.    
In the short-term, even existing SWP and CVP contractors relying on the Delta 
for all or a portion of their supplies face great uncertainty in terms of water supply 
reliability due to the uncertain outcome of the Bay-Delta proceedings.  For example, in 
1993, an above normal runoff year, environmental restrictions limited CVP deliveries to 
Westlands Irrigation District to only 50 percent of contracted supply.  Until solutions to 
the complex Delta problems are identified and put into place, even existing contractors 
relying on transport through the Delta will experience more frequent and severe water 
supply shortages, and the potential for more active trading of water, which would 
increase flows through the Delta, will be highly problematical.    Relatively simple 
irrigation infrastructure is not an intrinsic problem for development of water markets.  
Rather, it is the complex interaction of the hydrological, infrastructural, legal and 
political regimes that determine the feasibility of development of markets in tradable 
water rights.  The unique geographical conditions in California, combined with the high 




of balancing agricultural, urban, and environmental interests, are more constraining to 
water market development than are the relatively unsophisticated irrigation technologies 
in Chile and Mexico. 
PRIVATIZATION OF WATER SUPPLY AND MANAGEMENT 
A question that cuts across many of the issues described above is the delineation 
of roles between the private and public sectors in the management of a water market 
allocation system.  While the logic of development of tradable water rights leads toward 
significant privatization of water supply, operations, and management, the case studies 
indicate that a wide variety of divisions of public and private responsibilities are 
consistent with establishment of tradable water rights and increase flexibility of water 
trading.   
In California, water markets are, and likely will remain, highly regulated, and 
water allocation market implementation will require considerable central participation 
from the DWR and other state and federal agencies and projects.  This is because of (1) 
the strong burden of proof placed on potential transferrers to verify consumptive use and 
lack of direct and indirect damage to third party and environmental interests under the 
appropriative doctrine as it has evolved under California law; (2) the necessity to balance 
powerful interest groups and competing final demands for agricultural, urban, and 
environmental purposes, a challenge which is accentuated by; (3) the unique 
hydrological/geographical conditions governing water transfer in California, especially 
the fact that a large share of future water transfers will need to be transported through the 




in most cases through storage and delivery infrastructure that is already heavily 
committed to existing contractors.  The DWR (and the federal CVP) will therefore be 
expected to play a major role in facilitating transfers, including identification of transfer 
opportunities, determination of the amount of water available for transfer under 
individual transfer proposal, certification that trades do not cause third-party damages, 
and scheduling the actual transport of traded water in the SWP and other projects while 
meeting environmental requirements and contractual commitments. 
The Mexican reform undertakes a significant degree of privatization of 
infrastructure and decision-making, while retaining public control over other important 
functions.  As was mentioned above, in Mexico, the turnover of irrigation districts to 
water users was fundamental to the water law reform creating tradable water rights.  
Privatization of urban water and sewage companies is also proceeding quickly, with the 
government finalizing an international bid to operate, through a long term concession, the 
Mexico City water and sewage facilities, which will serve a population of 22 million 
people, to one or several private water companies.  A key objective of district turnover is 
to improve the funding of and eliminate subsidies to operation and maintenance of 
irrigation systems.  After turnover, WUAs are required to fund and implement O&M for 
the canals and other infrastructure under their control, with the level of fees set by the 
implementing regulations approved by Comision Nacional del Agua (CNA). 
Considerable success in improving cost recovery has already been achieved, with CNA 
reporting that farmer payments as a proportion of total O&M have increased from 18 




budget restrictions on O&M outlays, and because of informal transfer of irrigation 
district administration to water users, as the formal turnover proceeds. 
However, the CNA will retain control over dams and main (and larger secondary) 
channels and diversion structures both above the irrigation district level and within the 
district.  CNA will collect a fee on WUAs to pay for conveyance of water to the district 
and O&M on infrastructure within the ID which is retained under CNA control.  The 
water law also calls for approval of the construction of new water infrastructure only with 
the approval and participation in funding of capital costs by water users, but regulations 
to implement these provisions have not been activated. 
Chile has undertaken the most thorough privatization of water management and  
infrastructure.  In addition to the devolution of irrigation infrastructure to water user 
associations, urban water services have been privatized.   The state-owned urban water 
and sewage city services were highly subsidized and quite inefficient, both physically 
and economically.  Beginning in the early 1980s, the previously state-owned urban 
services were transformed into urban water and sewage companies.  Shares are owned in 
different proportions by the public, municipalities, the regional governments, and the 
national government, and are traded in the stock markets.  Since utility concessions are a 
natural monopoly, the maximum fees for the privatized urban water and sewage services 
are fixed by the Ministry of Commerce, taking into account the market price of raw 
water, amortization of infrastructure, preservation, maintenance, management, 




improvement.  Each utility fixes its rate, which must be below the maximum set by the 
government.   
Privatization of urban water services has dramatic efficiency and equity impacts.  
Reform has contributed to the expansion of coverage of potable water in urban areas 
from 63 percent in 1970 to 99 percent currently, and in agricultural areas from 27 percent 
to 94 percent.  In addition, the removal of broad based water subsidies has allowed the 
government to increase the level of subsidies targeted directly to the rates paid for urban 
water by low-income sectors of the population.  This subsidy amounts to a specified 
monthly free quantity of water (up to 20 m
3 per month) in predetermined sectors of the 
cities accounting for the poorest 20 percent of the population.  The subsidy is paid 
directly to the water company.  
Finally, a major innovation in Chile is creation of water rights prior to 
construction of an irrigation system, and requirement of consultation and approval for 
construction plans, together with participation in the capital cost by prospective rights 
holders, which establishes strong incentives for cost-effective investments in irrigation.   
Publicly funded irrigation construction requires active participation by potential users, 
commitment of at least one-third of prospective users for project development, and 
commitment by one-half of prospective users to acquire the infrastructure prior to the 
start of construction.  The infrastructure constructed under this process, and those 
previously constructed, and state-owned, must be transferred to the users, represented by 




Private financing of water infrastructure and water management and operation in 
Chile has worked in favor of the poorest sectors of the population.  The large reduction in 
subsidies generated by this policy again allows the government to target the poor, by 
subsidizing small farmers so that they can buy shares of water rights coming from new 
the new infrastructure.   Private financing of infrastructure also corrected inappropriate 
incentives which often led to construction of unprofitable infrastructure, and continuing 
large capital and operating subsidies financed in large part through tax resources.  This 
meant transferring resources from the poorest sectors of the population (who usually did 
not have subsidized water and spent a large percentage of their incomes in sales taxes), to 
the better-off who receive subsidized water.  Under the new policy, these tax resources 
were saved through private financing of infrastructure, self-financed and regulated urban 
water companies, and water users associations which  finance infrastructure and O & M 
costs. 
 
  5.  CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this paper we noted that water policy in developing countries 
faces several serious challenges: to increase water efficiency in all uses; to preserve and 
sustain the natural resources involved in water management; to sharply reduce the 
enormous amounts of financial resources invested and expended in state-managed water 
policies; and to increase the flexibility and responsiveness of resource allocation.  We 
then proceeded to describe the potential benefits of policy reform to establish markets in 




improvement in water use efficiency, reduced incentives to degrade the environment, 
acceptability to farmers, improved equity in the provision and financing of water 
services, and increased flexibility in resource allocation.  
Based on the experience of the countries studied, significant efficiency gains and 
economic and social benefits can be expected from the establishment of markets in 
tradable water rights.  Thus the review of experiences in Chile, MØxico and California 
shows that markets in tradable water rights can be a viable alternative to cope effectively 
with the challenges described above.  Chile’s longer term experience with market 
allocation of water indicates important strides toward achieving the a large share of the 
potential benefits from markets in tradable water rights.  MØxico, after a broad internal 
debate, passed a new water law in 1992 that shifted from state-managed water policy to a 
regulated market- oriented policy with tradable water rights.  Water trading will initially 
be closely supervised, but the law includes a number of provisions that will liberalization 
of water trade as the water users become more involved in operation and management of 
water and gain experience in water trading.  California, with a highly regulated 
institutional framework and a legal tradition of appropriative water rights that are far 
from the ideal tradable rights, has nevertheless evolved innovative policies which have 
expanded the use of market transfers to meet growing demand in urban, environmental, 
and high-valued agricultural uses.  Market transfers have become an important element in 
drought management policies. 
Chile adopted a comprehensive, market-oriented water policy nearly twenty years 




achievements in solving the above-mentioned policy challenges.  Tradable water rights in 
Chile have fostered efficient agricultural use of water, which has in turn increased 
agricultural productivity, generating more production per unit of water.  The market 
valuation of water at its scarcity value has induced farmer investment in on-farm 
irrigation technology which has saved water to irrigate more area or to sell to other uses; 
has induced a shift to high-valued crops which use less water per unit value of output; 
and has given farmers greater flexibility to shift cropping patterns according to market 
demand through the purchase, rent and lease of water. 
Market allocation of water has also induced improved efficiency in urban water 
and sewage services because the water and sewage companies can no longer get free 
water from the state, through expropriation from farmers.  When incremental water could 
be obtained for free, there was no need to improve either physical efficiency (pipes, 
metering, etc.), or economic efficiency.  Secure water rights held by the urban companies 
and an active market have encouraged the construction and operation of improved 
treatment plants that sell water for agricultural or urban use.  In addition, the Chilean 
water policy, by reducing huge construction and O&M subsidies to better-off farmers and 
urban water consumers, has freed-up public resources that have been utilized to provide 
direct, transparent, and efficient targeted subsidies for poor urban water users and small 
farmers.  
Given the precarious and poorly-defined water rights in most developing 
countries, comprehensive reform of water law is the most effective means of moving 




through tradable rights, the law should be simple and comprehensive, should clearly 
define the characteristics of water rights and the conditions and regulations governing the 
trade of water rights; establish and implement water rights registers; delineate the roles of 
the government, institutions, and individuals involved in water allocation and the ways of 
solving conflicts between them; and provide cost-effective protection against negative 
third party and environmental effects which can arise from water trades. 
The experiences in Chile, Mexico, and California also provide  guidance in 
resolving the complex issues that arise in the process of implementation of a system of 
markets in tradable water rights.  Issues that must be dealt with include the initial 
allocation of water rights, definition of rights as prior or proportional, the treatment of 
return flows, negative indirect economic effects, protection of the environment, the role 
of water user associations, infrastructural requirements, and the role of public and private 
institutions.  Some of the these questions appear to have relatively simple solutions.  
Basing the initial allocation of water rights largely on historical water use, combined (in 
Chile) with redistribution of concentrated water rights holdings, offers substantial gains 
in security to farmers and other water users.  Given the precarious nature of existing 
water rights in most developing countries, the establishment of secure and well-defined 
tradable rights will in most cases be perceived as an increase in wealth and equity.  
Highly sophisticated infrastructure is not required to implement water markets; effective 
water markets are operating in Chile with conveyance and distribution infrastructure no 




Other implementation questions are more complex, and the approach chosen often 
rests upon the balance that is desired between the degree of regulation to protect various 
interest that are affected by water trades and the level of transactions costs in water 
trading.  However, the case studies show that a variety of legal, institutional, regulatory 
solutions to these issues are compatible with functioning markets in tradable water rights.  
California, with a legal tradition in many ways inappropriate for water marketing, 
strongly entrenched interest groups with high stakes in water, and difficult hydrological 
and physical constraints to water transfers, has adopted a highly regulated approach to 
water markets with relatively high transaction costs.  Chile’s water law, while providing  
significant protection from direct adverse impacts from  
trade, places the emphasis on water market liberalization with low transactions 
costs.  Mexico has taken the middle ground, with a law that maintains strong government 
control of water trading, but that also allows for rapid relaxation in controls as experience 
is acquired in the market allocation of water.    
Even comprehensive water law reform allows a phased approach to 
implementation, which can begin with carefully regulated markets that are progressively 
opened up as market experience is gained.  Greater regulations at the outset will limit the 
size and scope of the market, and will likely reduce the efficiency gains (and equity 
gains, to the extent that they perpetuate large general subsidies which favor relatively 
well-off irrigators and urban water users).  The benefits produced by the Chilean reform 




but this may be an appropriate trade-off for risk-averse governments in the early stages of 
undertaking fundamental reform.   
Broad-based trends in the developing world are creating strong incentives for 
comprehensive water reform incorporating establishment of tradable water rights and the 
development of markets in these rights.  Existing inefficient water systems are under 
heavy pressure due to the increasing economic value of increasingly scarce water; the 
rising budgetary costs from highly subsidized capital development and operations and 
maintenance; and general economic liberalization, which boosts the cost of maintaining 
inflexible water allocation systems that cannot respond to changing incentives.  
Development of water allocation through markets in tradable water rights offers a viable 
approach to meeting these challenges, and should receive serious consideration from 
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